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UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION-A LEGAL ENTITY
FOR PURPOSES OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Plaintiff, a citizen of New Jersey, commenced a personal injury
action in the federal district court for the Southern District of New
York against American Express Company, an unincorporated joint
stock association organized under New York laws. Jurisdiction was
alleged solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The district
court held that the defendant association was itself incapable of being
a citizen and, since some member shareholders were shown to be citi-
zens of plaintiff's state, the complaint was dismissed for lack of total
diversity.' On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
reversed. Held: An unincorporated New York joint stock association
may possess sufficient characteristics of a legal entity to be treated as
a "citizen" of New York for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Puerto Rico v. Russell,2
there seemed little doubt that the citizenship of an unincorporated
association for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was to be determined
by the domicile of its individual members. In 1889, the Supreme
Court specifically refused, in Chapman v. Barney,' to extend citizen-
ship status beyond corporations' so as to include a New York joint
stock association.5 In the Russell case, however, the Court held that a
sociedad (an unincorporated association under civil law), because it
possessed characteristics similar to those of a corporation, was to be
treated like a corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Al-
though several commentators considered Russell a major departure
from the rule of Chapman,6 the federal courts prior to the present case
1 Mason v. American Express Co., 224 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
2288 U.S. 476 (1933), 33 CoLUTM. L. REv. 540, 47 HARV. L. REv. 135.
1 129 U.S. 677.
4 In 1844, the United States Supreme Court had declared in Louisville C. & C. R.R.
v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 478, that for purposes of diversity, a corporation was an
artificial entity capable of citizenship in the state of its creation. See McGouney, A
Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jirisdictio; of the
Federal Courts (pts. 1-3), 56 HARv. L. REv. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943). See also Moore &
Weekstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court
Fiction Revisited, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1426 (1964).
5 The Chapmn decision was applied to other unincorporated associations in the
Federal courts. See, e.g., Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904) (board
of trustees); Great So. Fireproof Hotel v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (limited partner-
ship); Russell v. Central Labor Union, 1 F.2d 412 (E. D. Ill., 1924) (labor union),
38 HARv. L. REv. 510 (1925).
6 E.g., HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL. SYs=aM 917-18(1953) ; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 17.25, at 1413 (3d ed. 1948) ; WRIGHT, FEDERAL.
COURTS 78-79 (1963).
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interpreted Russell as a special fact situation and continued to follow
Chapman.7
The court in the principal case justified its departure from the
Chapman rule on the ground that Chapman was impliedly overruled
when the Supreme Court adopted the flexible approach of Russell.
The court considered Chapman to be superficially brief and to estab-
lish a mechanical rule, whereas Russell involved a close factual anal-
ysis of the principal legal characteristics8 of the sociedad in finding it
to be a juridical entity and-like a corporation-capable of citizen-
ship. The court in the principal case then followed what it considered
to be the Russell "approach" to determine whether the "essential legal
characteristics" of the New York joint stock association brought de-
fendant within federal diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that
the defendant association was sufficiently endowed with the essential
characteristics9 to be a "legal personality apart from its individual
7 See, e.g., R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 336 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958 (1965) (labor union) ; Hanson v. Chicago
B. &. 0. RR., 282 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 850 (1960) (labor
union) ; Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 871 (1960) (New York joint stock association) ; Arbuthnot v. State Automo-
bile Insurance Ass'n, 264 F2d 260 (10th Cir. 1959), 46 VA. L.REv. 346 (1960) (inter-
insurance exchange) ; Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert de-
nied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958) (labor union) ; Swain v. First Church of Christ Scientist,
225 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1955) (church association); Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots
Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951) (airline pilots association).
s Among the characteristics of the sociedad under Puerto Rican law which the
Supreme Court listed as important indicia of that organization's status as a distant
legal person were the following: its creation by articles of association filed as public
records; its capacity to contract, own property, transact business, and sue and be sued
in its own name and right; its ability to endure for a prescribed period regardless of
the death or withdrawal of individual members; the preference granted its creditors to
reach its property and assets ahead of the creditors of its individual members; and the
vesting of the powers of management over its affairs in the hands of managers who
alone could perform acts legally binding on it. 334 F.2d at 395.
9 Under New York law, a joint stock association is created pursuant to written
articles of association which are filed, like a certificate of incorporation, as a public
record; the association is authorized to have capital stock divided into shares, and to
provide that upon the death of a shareholder or the transfer of his shares no dissolution
is to be worked upon the association, N.Y. GEN. Ass'xs LAW § 3(1); management of
its affairs can be concentrated in the sole hands of directors, N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAw
3(2) ; the association can purchase, hold, and convey real property in the name of its
president, N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAW § 6; it can sue and be sued in the name of its officers
without joining as parties the shareholder members, N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAW §§ 12, 13;
the shareholders may be sued without prior action against the association, N.Y. GEN.
Ass'Ns LAW § 17. The difference in personal liability between a corporation stock-
holder and an unincorporated association member was thought to be insignificant. 334
F.2d at 401. In Russell the Supreme Court had also recognized that a sociedad dif-
fered from a corporation in that sociedad members were personally liable in the event
that the organization's assets were insufficient to satisfy such debts. In rejecting this
distinction as insignificant, the Supreme Court said, "this liability is of no more con-
sequence for present purposes than that imposed on corporate stockholders by the
statutes of some states." Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 481 (1933).
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members," and therefore it was "just and sensible to regard it as a
separate entity"'" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Unincorporated associations have been treated as "legal personali-
ties" apart from their individual members for purposes of venue,1
service of process,12 taxation," bankruptcy, and miscellaneous fed-
eral regulations. 5 Treatment as a legal entity for some purposes, how-
ever, does not necessitate treatment as an entity for all purposes. For
example, a corporation has been recognized as a "person" within the
meaning of fifth amendment due process 1 and fourth amendment
search and seizure," but not a person within the meaning of fifth
amendment self-incrimination 8 or a citizen under the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9 Similarly, unincor-
porated associations have been held to be separate legal entities for
some purposes but not others.20 In deciding whether to treat a corpora-
tion as a separate entity for purposes other than diversity, courts have
generally looked to the legal effect of such treatment rather than to
the legal characteristics of the corporation.1 Justification for extending
entity status to unincorporated associations for diversity purposes
should also be based upon reasons distinct from the characteristics
of the association.
The court in the principal case justified its decision on the basis
that all the reasons for extending citizenship status to corporations for
diversity purposes apply with equal force to the defendant joint stock
association. 2 However, diversity was extended to corporations due to
fear of prejudicial treatment by local courts, and access to federal
courts was thought necessary to encourage corporate growth and
10 334 F.2d at 400.
"E.g., Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 307 F2d 21 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963).
'
2 Fun. _ CIV. P. 4(d) (3).
Is IxT. REv. CoDe oF 1954 § 7701 (a) (3).
14 Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(6) (1958).
Is See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 44
(1958) ; Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 796(3) (1958).
'I Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878).
3" Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
18 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
19 Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548 (1928).2 0 See, e.g., Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W2d 782, 786
(1960), where the court pointed out that generally a union member cannot sue his union
because it has no separate entity, but that there may be fact situations when it would
be "unjust" or "unrealistic' to apply this rule. In such cases the court should regard a
union in legal contemplation as separate from its members.2 1 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Western Turf Ass'n v.
Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
22 334 F.2d at 402.
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nationwide expansion, and to protect interstate commerce." Current
bias toward out-of-state business associations cannot be accurately
gauged, but the probability of prejudicial treatment is slight..2 1 If
prejudicial treatment should occur, constitutional protections are avail-
able. 5 One study has specifically indicated that fear of local bias is
rarely a consideration when litigants decide to invoke diversity juris-
diction.26
As the court in the principal case pointed out, Puerto Rico v. Rus-
sell" created doubts about the continued vitality of the Chapman rule.
The Court's analysis in Russell represented a distinct departure from
the formula adopted in Chapman. Russell, however, might be limited
to its facts; the question at issue in Russell did not involve diversity
within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, but rather inter-
pretation of Puerto Rico's Organic Act.28  In fact, the effect of the
Russell analysis was to deprive the parties in that case of federal
23 In Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 37 (1809), Chief Justice
Marshall had observed that the framers of the Constitution had "entertained fears and
apprehensions of possible local bias in the state courts," (Id. at 50) and therefore fed-
eral tribunals were provided for controversies between citizens of different states. Cf.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 141, 160 (1816), where Mr. Justice
Story said:
... the Constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly, we do not in-
quire) that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests,
might sometimes obstruct, or control, the regular administration of justice .... No
other reason that that which has been stated can be assigned, why some, at least,
of those cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the state courts.
See also Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 3, 14-28 (1948); ALI, STUDY OF THE DMnSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 50-51 (Tent. Draft. No. 2, 1964).24 See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code. 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216 (1948) ; Warren, New Light on the History of the Fed-
eral Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 83 (1923). But see Brown, The
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L.
REv. 179 (1929). Labor unions, however, may frequently encounter hostile state
courts, particularly in the South. See Comment, Unions as Juridical Persons, 66 YALE
L.J. 712, 745 (1957).25 See Wechsler, supra note 24, at 235-36.
26 Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choices of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933 (1962). Cf. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348
U.S. 48, 53 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Diversity jurisdiction, however,
may still be useful in protecting out-of-state persons against infirmities and injustices
of local practices and procedures. Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426,
1449 (1964). But see 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICES § 9 (1960, Supp.
1964) ; Fowvks & Harvey, 77te New Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, 36 F.R.D. 51
(1964).
27 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
28 The Organic Act confers jurisdiction on the United States District Court for
Puerto Rico in "all controversies where all of the parties on either side of the contro-
versy are citizens or subjects of a foreign state or states, or citizens of a state, "Terri-
tory or District of the United States not domiciled in Puerto Rico ..." 39 Stat. 915-66(1917), as amended, 48 U.S.C. § 863 (1958). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The
Judicial power shall extend to all Cases ... between Citizens of different States...."
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jurisdiction." Moreover, the Court explicitly distinguished between
the capacity for citizenship of an unincorporated association under our
common law, and the status of a sociedad under the civil law of Puerto
Rico.2
By extending diversity jurisdiction, the application of the Russell
approach to the facts in the principal case ignores the restrictive atti-
tude of both the Supreme Court and Congress. Individual justices on
the Court have been outspoken critics of diversity jurisdiction." Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Elbert,32 advocated abolishment of diversity jurisdiction because it had
outlived its usefulness. In another case, the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan accused the majority of a "distaste for diversity juris-
diction."3 Mr. Justice Black has characterized the Court as having
adopted the corollary position of extending permissible state jurisdic-
tion:
... a trend is dearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our
national economy over the years."
Previous decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
20 See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsrmr 917-18
(1953); Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 398 (2d Cir. 1964).3 oThe Supreme Court stated in Russell, 288 U.S. at 480:
The tradition of the common law is to treat as legal persons only incorporated
groups and to assimilate all others to partnerships.... The tradition of the civil
law, as expressed in the Code of Puerto Rico, is otherwise.
At least two federal courts have distinguished the Russell case because the decision
is based upon Puerto Rico civil law. R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958 (1965) ; Gaunt v.
Lloyds America of San Antonio, 11 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Tex. 1935). Cf. Sutherland
v. United States, 74 F.2d 89, 93 (8th Cir. 1934).
31 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux City, 360 U.S. 25, 41 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53, 59-60
(1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334, 336
(1943) (Douglas, J, concurring) ; Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ; Indianapolis v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76, 84 (1941) (Jackson, J., dissenting); JAcKsoN, THE
SuPRmE COURT IN THE AsmEc AN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 38 (1955).
32348 U.S. 48, 53 (1954). Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
[B]y overruling the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, despite its century-old cre-
dentials, this Court uprooted the most noxious weeds that had grown around di-
versity jurisdiction. What with the increasing permeation of national feeling and
the mobility of modem life, little excuse is left for diversity jurisdiction, now that
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, has put a stop to the unwarranted
freedom of federal courts to fashion rules of local law in defiance of local law. Id.
at 56.
Can it fairly be said that state tribunals are not now established on a sufficiently
"good footing" to adjudicate state litigation that arises between citizens of differ-
ent States, including the artificial corporate citizens. . . . Id. at 59.
33 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux City, 360 U.S. 25, 41 (1959).
34 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
1965]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
have also recognized "'doctrinal trends' in the Supreme Court...
manifesting a marked disposition not to enlarge but to reduce federal
jurisdiction .... ."
In 1958 Congress amended section 1332 of the Judicial Code" to
provide that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any state in
which it is incorporated and also of the state in which it maintains its
principal place of business. This provision was intended to limit the
availability of federal courts when the sole basis for federal jurisdiction
is diversity of citizenship, 7 as diversity will rarely occur when a cor-
poration is a citizen of both the state of incorporation and the state
where it conducts its principal activities.
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court and Congress wish
to limit federal jurisdiction. The caseload of the federal judiciary is
critically overburdened. The feeling exists that the time and energy
of the federdal judiciary should be preserved for resolving those con-
troversies in which federal interests are at stake. 9 Because these mat-
ters were not taken into consideration, the "legal characteristics" test
of the principal case is subject to the same criticism as Chapman, i.e.,
a mechanical approach which fails to consider the underlying reasons
for extending or limiting diversity jurisdiction.
The test of the principal case will be difficult to apply because of
conflicting definitions of "essential legal characteristics." Defendant
association, for example, was previously found not to possess the essen-
tial characteristics of a legal entity by the Court of Appeals for the
35 Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F2d 895, 903 (2d Cir. 1943). See Kresberg v. Inter-
national Paper Co. 149 F2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1945).
3628 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958).
37 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958) ; H.R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1958). See generally Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1426,
1431-33 (1964) ; Note, 44 MiNN. L. Rxv. 308, 310-14 (1959).
38 At the forty-second annual meeting of the American Law Institute, Chief Justice
Warren commented:
I have had to report to you the ever-increasing workload of our federal courts and
the backlogs which have occurred in judicial process. It had been my expectation
that with the authorization of 73 new judgeships in 1961, we would by this time
have seen a substantial decline in these serious backlogs. I must admit to disap-
pointment and grave concern, however, that we have made so little progress in
conquering this situation ... I must ... express to you my feeling of alarm that
our solution to the mounting workload of the courts seems to depend so largely on
the creation of additional judgeships. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2613 (1965).
See also ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BrwEEN STATE AND FED-
EAL COURTS, 167, 175 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964). For earlier data see Wechsler,
supra note 24, at 234; Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 499 (1933).
89 See generally Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Wechsler, supra note 24, at 238.
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Sixth Circuit."' In fact, neither Russell nor Mason specify the essential
characteristics which are necessary to constitute an association a "legal
entity separate from its individual members."' Application of the
"essential legal characteristics" test to the largest class of unincorpo-
rated associations---labor unions-was explicitly rejected by the Fourth
Circuit.42 The Fourth Circuit limited Russell to its facts, and found
that Congress, in amending section 1332 of the Judicial Code, had spe-
cifically restricted diversity jurisdiction to corporations4 The Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari on this decision, and it is scheduled
for argument early in the October 1965 term."
The American Law Institute has recently proposed that an unincor-
porated association capable of suing or being sued in its common name
in the state where an action is brought shall be deemed a citizen for
diversity purposes of the state where it has its principal place of busi-
ness." The ALl proposal is justified on the grounds that it will not
force the association (particularly labor unions) to circumvent Chap-
man by way of a class action under rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." As this proposal disregards the "essential legal
characteristics" of an association, many organizations that would
qualify for diversity under the ALI proposal would not qualify under
the test adopted in the principal case.
A possible alternative to the "legal characteristics" test of the prin-
cipal case, and to the ALI proposal, would be to grant an unincorpo-
40 Brocki v. American Express Co., 279 F2d 785 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 871 (1960).
41 The Russell and Mason opinions may provide "guidlines" for determining when
an association possess sufficient characteristics to be deemed a citizen (see notes 8
& 9 supra), but they did not specify whether all those standards were necessary char-
acteristics. Cf. Comment, Unincorporated Associations: Diversity Jurisdiction and
the ALI Proposal, 1965 DuxE L.J. 329, 337 (1965).
42R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 336 F2d 160 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
43 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Other reasons may be more compelling
for rejecting application of the principal case to labor unions. Extending federal juris-
diction solely on the basis of diversity may have created serious inconsistencies in the
statutory scheme for labor regulation. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1124, 1126 (1964).
4379 U.S. 958 (1965). Bouligny will be the first case since 1904 in which the
question of whether an unincorporated association shall be deemed a citizen for diver-
sity purposes is directly presented before the Supreme Court. Previously, the Court
had denied certiorari in cases which presented this question. See cases cited supra
note 7.
45 ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1301(b) (2), at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964). Most jurisdictions have
statutes allowing unincorporated associations to sue or be sued as an entity. Comment,
66 YALE L.J. 712, 714 (1957).
40 ALI, STUDY OF THE DImsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURT 61-62 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964). Cf. Note, The Problem of Capacity in Union
Suits: A Potpourri of Erie, Diverrity and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68
YALE L... 1182, 1185 (1959).
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rated association juridical status for diversity purposes whenever the
circumstances of the particular case warranted such an approach. This
"equitable result" test has been applied to a corporation in order to
find it an association of persons rather than a legal entity as necessary
to "promote justice" or to "obviate inequitable results." 7 Other legal
fictions adopted by the common law (e.g., "juridical entity", "piercing
the corporate veil", "alter ego") have resulted in the court's losing
sight of the basic rationale underlying the legal fiction. The analysis in
the principal case follows this approach, and consequently falls to ask
the critical question: is diversity jurisdiction justified in this case by
local prejudice, economic considerations, or some other compelling
reason?
4T Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51
HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1402 (1938) as quoted in LATrlN, CORPOATIONs 67 (1959). Cf.
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 216, 238-40 (1948). Professor Wechsler advocated that the diversity
jurisdiction should be limited to "situations where it is in fact responsive to such
need." Id. at 240.
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